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Abstract
In April 1991, the massive influx of
Iraqi refugees into Turkey precipitated
a political process that led to one of the
rare examples of humanitarian inter-
vention. Under pressurefrom the Turk-
ish government and world' public
opinion, Western allies declared a safe
zone above the 36th parallel in northern
Iraq and launched "Operation Provide
Comfort." This Operation enabled the
extension of relief assistance to almost
half a million refugees and their repa-
triation ta northern Iraq within a rela-
tively short period of time. The article
tries to establish whether "Operation
Provide Comfort" served state security
interests or the security of the refugees
fro'm Iraq.
Précis
L'afflux massifdes réfugiés irakiens en
Turquie d'avril 1991 suscita un proces-
sus aboutissant à un exemple rare de
l'intervention humanitaire. Sous pres-
sion du gouvernement turc ainsi que du
grand public mondial, les alliés occiden-
taux déclarèrent une zone de sécurité en
Irak septentrional au-dessus du 36e pa-
rallèle, tout en lançant l'Opération
"Provide Comfort". Cette Opération
facilitait du secours aux quelques cen-
taines de milles de réfugiés qui rega-
gnaient leur rapatriement dans un délai
relativement court. Cet article essaie à
déterminer ou l'Opération "Provide
Comfort" adesservi les intérêts de sécu-
rité de l'état ou plutôt a-t-elle favorisé
ceux des réfugiés irakiens.
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With the end of the Cold War, the
international community has paid
growing attention to humanitarian in-
tervention as a potentially effective
way of providing protection for refu-
gees. However, in practice, mobilizing
international support for humanitar-
ian intervention has been fraught with
political problems. Oftengovernments
have failed to show the necessary po-
litical will to support such operations.
Furthermore, governrnents have
tended to give priority to respecting
principles of state sovereignty over
supporting policies aimed at prevent-
ing or stopping massive human rights
violations. One exception to this reluc-
tance of the international community
to commit itself to humanitarian inter-
vention was the launching of "Opera-
tion Provide Comfort" (OPC) in April
1991..
The defeat of the Iraqi military by
the Allied coalition forces created an
environment conducive ta rebellion by
the Shia in southern Iraq and Kurds in
the north. The Kurdish nationalist up-
rising seemed to be successful until the
Iraqi military turned aIl its might
against the Kurds after having crushed
the Shia rebellion in the south. To-
wards the end of March 1991, it was
becoming quite clear that the Kurdish
uprising was soon going to collapse.
The Kurds had expected that the
United States would enforce an earlier
ban on Iraqi helicopters and gunships
in addition to fixed wing aircrafts.
When this did not occur and President
Bush instead declared that he did "not
want one single soldier or airman
shoved into a civil war in Iraq that's
been going on for ages" and that the
"Iraqi people must decide their own
political future," the Iraqi authorities
took this as a green light to suppress
the Kurdish uprising.2
Until that point there had been con-
siderable optimism among the
Kurdish leadership that they would
soon be able to enjoy autonomy.3 It is
probably this sense of optimism that
caught the Kurds by surprise. The eu-
phoria turned very quickly into a mas-
sive uprootment as thousands of Iraqi
Kurds fled their homes ahead of the
advancing Iraqi army and sought ref-
uge in the mountaino'us region where
the frontiers of Iraq, Iran and Turkey
meet. According to a US expert on refu-
gee problems this was
a worst-case refugee disaster. In
days, more than a million people
have gathered on steep, cold moun-
tain sides without any infrastructure.
To get food and supplies to them is a
challenge which exceeds that of the
Berlin Airlift; instead of one city, we
must feed people scattered through
sorne of the least accessible, most re-
mote points on earth.4
It was in the face of such a humanitar-
ian crisis that the western govern-
ments decided to intervene. A safe
haven innorthern Iraq was created and
OPC began. By early summer, most
refugees had been repatriated to nortl1-
ern Iraq.
The main aim of this article is to ex-
plore whether this rare post-Cold War
example of humanitarian intervention
to resolve a refugee crisis served the
interests of refugees or states. With this
question in mind, the article is divided
into three sections. The first section
examines the decision making process
that paved the way for the launching of
OPC. The second one looks at the repa-
triation and resettlement processes of
the refugees from Turkey. In the con-
clusion, 1 will argue that OPC was
launched only partly with the security
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Often governments have failed to show the necessary political will
to support such [humanitarian intervention) operations.
They have tended to give priority to respecting principles ofstate
sovereignty over supporting policies aimed at preventing or
stopping massive human rights violations.
and interests of refugees in mind. In-
stead, the Operation was also aimed at
meeting the national security needs of
Turkey, a long-standing ally of the
western world and member of NATO.
Launching Operation Provide
Comfort
Early in April 1991, the Turkish gov-
ernment received with great alarm re-
ports of a growing number of refugees
climbing up the mountains on the Iraqi
border. The fact that the regions of
Turkey bordering Iraq are populated
by Kurds and that a Kurdish separatist
group, the Workers' Party of Kurdis-
tan (PKK),hadbeen wagingwaron the
government in the same region since
1984 was an additional concern. The
salience of the escalating refugee crisis
to Turkish na.tional security was very
much reflected in the government's
decision to calI for an emergency meet-
ing of the National Security Council
(NSC).5 A senior Foreign Ministry offi-
cial argued that "Iraqi refugees (were)
forcibly directed toward the Turkish
border and that constituted a threat to
our security."6
At the NSC meeting there was an
attempt to balance conflicting inter-
ests. On the one hand, there was a clear
recognition that most of these refugees
were the kin of Kurds in Turkey, and
that it was essential to come to their
help for good palitical, if nat humani-
tarian reasons. 7 On the other hand,
however, there was the fear that allow-
ing the refugees in the mountains to
come down into Turkey .might have a
snowball effect, attracting even larger
numbers. As Hale notes, the Turkish
government feared that if the refugees
gained access to Turkish territory "it
would acquire the long-term responsi-
bility for their care and accommoda-
tion, with next to no international
assistance once the world's attention
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moved on to other problems."g The
Turkish government's initial emphasis
was on securing Turkish national in-
terests rather than the interests of the
r.efugees. Hence, the government de-
cided to keep the border closed until a
reaction could be solicited from the
United Nations Security Council. A
letter was immediately sent to the Se-
curity Council calling for a meeting
and noting that a situation threatening
to peace and security had emerged.9
The military, which had been in-
structed to keep the refugees out of
Turkey at aIl cost short of firing at
them, failed to implement the decision
and a growing number of refugees
continued topourintoTurkey. Thefact
that the area along the Iraqi frontier is
"inhabited by a population that
through ethnie and family ties was
strongly sympathetic to the plight of
the refugees" created mounting do-
mestic pressure on the government to
change its policy.ID Furthermore, the
Turkish government's decision to·
deny the refugees asylum had gener-
ated tremendous international resent-
ment and bad publicity for Turkey. A
combination of these factors coupled
with developments favourable to Tur-
key at the Security Councilled to a re-
versaI of the decision to keep the
border closed.
The initial Turkish reluctance to
open its borders aggravated the crisis,
increasing international pressure to
come to the assistance of the refugees
in an effective manner. The French
government was among the first to re-
spond. Through their experienced
Minister of Humanitarian Affairs
Bernard Kouchner, they were weIl dis-
posed to res-pond. Ideologically, as
weIl, the French felt cbmfortable with
the idea of adopting a radical answer
to the problem. This was reflected in
the French Foreign Minister Roland
Dumas' conviction that "just as Ger-
many's murder of Europe's Jews
brought about the concept of a l'crime
against humanity,' so Mr. Husseins's
mistreatment of the Kurds argued for
recognition of a l'dutY to intervene' to
prevent gross violations of human
rights."ll It was this attitude that moti-
vated France to calI for amendments to
the ceasefire Resolution between Coa-
lition allies and Iraq that was being
negotiated at the Security Council. l2
The failure of this attempt and the
fact that Resolution 687 establishing a
ceasefire between Iraq and the UN
Coalition did not make any reference
to the refugee crisis forced Turkish di-
plomacy to become more active. In the
morning of April 5, 1991, a critical
meeting of Turkish diplomats with
their West European counterparts was
held in Ankara. During this meeting a
draft version of the eventual Resolu-
tion 688 seems to have been discussed
and agreed upon.13 Later in the day,
the French submitted this resolution to
the Security Council where it was
adopted by a vote of 10 for, 3 against
(Cuba, Yemen and Zimbabwe) and
two abstentions (China and India).14
From the Turkish government's
point of view, this Resolution was im-
portant for two reasons. First, the situ-
ation resulting from the refugee crisis
was defined as a threat to international
peace and security. This was to open
the way, for the Turkish govemment
and allies, to argue that a need had
arisen to establish a safe haven and
create a military force to protect it. The
second reason was that the Resolution
insisted that Iraq allow immediate ac-
cess to humanitarian assistance for
those in need. This enabled the Turk-
ish government to argue its case for
bringing the refugees from the moun-
taintops down to the Iraqi sicle of the
border, which was topographically
more suitable for extending relief as-
sistance to the refugees.
As the tragedy of this refugee exo-
dus unfolded on television screens, the
late Turgut Ozal, the President of Tur-
key at the time~ started to advocate the
idea of creating a "safe zone." Adopt-

















Table 1: Repatriation of Refugees
from the 1991 Exodus between
April 14-June l, 199126
Dale Number
Although the 1991 refugee influx was
mainly characterized as a Kurdish exo-
dus, there were also many Arabs,
Asyrians, Chaldeans and Turcomans
among the Kurdish refugees. How-
ever, there are no separate statistics on
these groups, and sorne were moved to
a number of separate camps in Turkey
while others received residence per-
mits after posting a bond or finding a
relative to sponsor them. Eventually,
aIl those in camps were moved to one
refugee camp in Eastern Anatolia. By
late 1991, there were 1,345 refugees,
from five different ethnie groups in
this camp.27 They basically did not
want to go back to Iraq, and together
with the refugees in Silopi, expected to
be resettled in third countries.
Most of these refugees have in the
meantime been resettled in many
Western countries, including Aus-
traliaandNew Zealand. Table 2 shows
the breakdown of resettled refugeesby
regions within the Western world. By
the end of 1994, there were 6,156 such
to a camp normally used to house Haj
pilgrims near the border with Iraq.24
The repatriation process from Turkey
also enabled most of the approxi-
mately 1.4 million Kurdish refugees




Table 2: Number of Refugees from the
1991 Mass Exodus by Region of Resettlement28
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
6 237 96 12











By early June, the last of the border
camps was closed and the remaining
13,000 re(ugees in Turkey were moved
way OPC was thus officially launched.
Its mission was defined as the conduct
of"multinationalhumanitarian opera-
tions to provide immediate relief to
displaced Iraqi civilians until interna-
tional relief agencies and private vol-
untary organizations can assume
overall supervision."19 By the end of
May 1991, the militarywing ofProvide
Comfort had grown to more than
21,000 troops from Il countries.20 The
Operation was also strengthened by an
air attachment deployed in Turkey
near the Iraqi border to deter Iraq from
violating the no-fly ban north of the
36th parallel. OPC, with the accompa-
nying safe haven, generated a strong
sense of security that was needed to
ensure repatriation of the refugees.
Repatriation, Rehabilitation and
Resettlement of the Refugees
A repatriation program was devel-
oped and put into place by late Apri1.21
The 460,000 refugees were first
brought down from the mountains to
approximately 20 transit camps along
the Turkish-Iraqi frontier.22 As can be
see seen from Table 1, the repatriation
of the refugees to northern Iraq was
then completed at an unusually fast
speed:
The first wave of voluntary repatria-
tion to Iraq from Turkey started in
the last week of April 1991 ... Within
five weeks, 95 per cent of Dohuk's
more than 400,000 former residents
had returned, as had another 60,000
persons who lived beyond its bor-
ders in (Iraqi) government control-
led territory, butwho were unwilling
to proceed there."23
that it was necessary for the refugees to
be brought down from the snow cov-
ered mountaintops to the plains on the
Iraqi side of the border. He was also
aware that in order to extend assist-
ance to the refugees and ensure their
retum, there was an immediate need
to stop Iraqi aggression and create a
secure environment. In a critical con-
versation with US President George
Bush, he made it very clear that Turkey
was being overwhelmed, and that he
expected to see the United States come
to the support of a NATO ally that had
proved its loyalty during the Gulf
War.l5
The 8th of April marked a tuming
point. President Bush, under intense
public opinion pressure, heeded
Ozal's calI and ordered US humanitar-
ian airdrops for the displaced on the
mountaintops. At the same, time he
also dispatched the Secretary of State,
James Baker, to Turkey. The visit of
Baker to the border area on the 8th of
Aprillasted only 7 minutes. But what
he observed was more than enough to
convince him that something urgent
and out of the ordinary had to be
done.16 In the meantime, the idea for a
safe zone was taken by the British
Prime Minister, John Major, to a Euro-
pean Community meeting in Brussels,
specially convened to discuss this cri-
sis. Ozal's initial idea of a safe zone
along the border to provide easier de-
livery of humanitarian aid was found
to be somewhat problematic. Western
governmental officiaIs feared that this
might create a "Gaza Strip-like" situa-
tion. Instead, Major pushed for an "en-
clave" (later changed to a "safe
haven") large enough to ensure the
retum of the refugees to their villages
and towns from where they had been
uprooted.17
The European Community's idea of
a safe haven coupled with Baker's re-
port, led President Bush to announce
his new policy in whichhe wamed Iraq
not to operate any aircraft or engage in
any military operation above the 36th
parallel. At the same time, on April 16,
he announced that US troops would
enter northem Iraq to create a safe area
in the flat lands around Zakhu.18 In this
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Clearly, Western public opinion pressure and a powerful sense of
public solidarity with the plight ofthe Kurdish refugees were
important factors that bore heavily on the eventual decisi()n to
declare a safe haven and launch Operation Provide Comfort.
refugees resettled out ofTurkey. How-
ever, these statistics only include reset-
tlement cases that UNHCR has been
either involved in or informed about.
There are also cases where countries
have taken refugees without the
knowledge of UNHCR. A good case in
point is Australia which took 2,000
refugees in 1992 in addition to the ones
reported in Table 2.
There were factors other than the
creation of a safe haven above the 36th
parallel and the launching of OPC that
facilitated the return of refugees. The
involvement and presence of the UN
on the ground in northern Iraq was
also critical to the success of the repa-
triation program. The political will
demonstrated particularly by the US
and the French governments to inter-
vene in support of the refugees in turn
enabled the United Nations to negoti-
ate a critical deal with the Iraqi authori-
ties, to bring assistance to returning
refugees as weIl as to internally dis-
placed persons within Iraq. On 18
April 1991, the UN signed a Memoran-
dum of Understanding authorizing
the United Nations to run humanitar-
ian assistance and relief programs in
Iraq. In May, an additional agreement
was signed enabling the UN to deploy
up to 500 guards to protect its humani-
tarian centres.
These agreements greatly enhanced
the ability of the UN and other interna-
tional agencies to operate in Iraq. The
growing presence of personnel from
international govemmental and non-
governmental agencies provided a
psychologically important additional
sense of security for returning refu-
gees. More importantly, the UNintro-
duced programs to rebuild and
rehabilitate villages destroyed by the
Iraqimilitary. UNHCR,asthe UNlead
agency in northem Iraq, not only man-
aged the repatriation of the refugees
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but also assisted the reconstruction of
more than 1,200 villages.29
The cost of the relief assistance
brought to the refugees, together with
the cost of their repatriation and reinte-
gration to Iraq, made this operation
one of the most expensive of its kind.
The figure offered by the European
Union for the cost of international as-
sistance provided for the various pro-
grams by the end of the summer of
1991, stood at more than one billion
dollars.3o The cost of the assistance pro-
vided by the US government and the
UNHCR for the refugees during the
Fiscal Year 1991, was US$583 and
US$152 million, respectively.31 The
Turkish govemment for its part spent
another US$257 million on relief and
assistance operations.32 These figures
do not include the cost of the military
portion of OPC.
Conclusion
OPC can be considered a successful
example of a rare occasion of humani-
tarian intervention. Once it became
operational it effectively facilitated the
provision ofhumanitarian relief assist-
ance to almost half a million refugees.
It provided a protective shield for not
only the refugees but also the inter-
nally displaced in northern Iraq, by
constituting a credible military deter-
rent against the Iraqimilitary. Lastly, it
created a conducive environment for
the repatriation of refugees in an ex-
ceptionally short period of time. Yet,
was it an overwhelming concern to
ensure the security of the refugees, or
was it Western governmental solidar-
ity to assist a political and military ally,
which paved the way to this almost
unprecedented case of humanitarian
intervention? This is a difficult ques-
tion to answer.
Clearly, Western public opinion
pressure and a powerful sense of pub-
lic solidarity with the plight of the
Kurdish refugees were important fac-
tors that bore heavily on the eventual
decision to declare a safe haven and
launch OPC. However, the diplomatic
efforts of Turkish officiaIs (especially
Turkish President, Turgut Ozal, who
had supported UN decisions against
Iraq and had developed a close rela-
tionship with George Bush during the
course of the Gulf crisis) to convince
their Western counterparts to help
Turkey appears to have also played a
critical, if not determining, role. The
importance that Western govemment
officiaIs gave to solidarity with the se-
curity needs of a NATO ally is demon-
strated by the fact that there was little
orno assistance extended to Iran which
faced a much bigger refugee influx. As
Frelick notes, U[i]n effect, the refugees
for whom Iran was the nearest border
were penalized for their hosts' poor
relations with the US."33 Furthermore,
the choice of the 36th parallel, north of
which Iraq was effectively banned
from any military activity, appears to
have been influenced, at least to some
extent, by the fact that most of the refu-
gees that had fled to Turkey came from
areas above the 36th parallel. There-
fore, the special circumstances that
surround the launching of OPC seems
to suggest that it may have been a
unique humanitarian intervention that
came about U as much to shore up po-
litical alliances with friendly govern-
ments as to assist the refugees."34 œ
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